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Do mutual funds herd in industries?
Umut Celikera,b,1t Jaideep Chowdhuryc,2, Gokhan Sonaerd,*

1. Introduction

Herding is commonly defined as the similarities in trading of a
group of market participants. Previous studies propose two main
micro-level herding measures to examine evidence of herding of
a group of market participants.3 Lakonishok et al. (1992, hereafter
LSV) construct a herding measure that detects quarterly imbalances
in the number of buyers and sellers from a particular group in specific stocks while Sias (2004, hereafter Sias) proposes a measure that
quantifies the degree to which such imbalances tend to persist over
adjacent quarters. In this paper, we use the two herding measures to

investigate whether mutual funds herd in industries and the possible
effects of such behavior on industry returns.
The extant literature provide mixed evidence of herding using
either one of the two proposed herding measures. LSV report weak
evidence of herding by pension funds in individual stocks and find
no evidence that such herding has a destabilizing effect on stock
prices. Likewise, Grinblatt et al. (1995, hereafter GTW) use the
LSV measure to examine mutual fund herding in individual stocks
and report weak herding levels. Wermers (1999) carries out a similar analysis on a larger sample of mutual funds and finds similar
evidence of herding. In addition, he documents that stocks that
are subjected to buy herding outperform stocks that are subjected
to sell herding both in the herding quarter and in the following two
quarters. Sias uses his above mentioned alternative herding measure and finds strong evidence of herding by institutions in individual stocks.
The above surveyed studies focus on stock herding and on the
effect that such herding may have on the returns of stocks. Differ
ent from the above literature, a related recent study by Choi and
Sias (2009) investigates industry herding by institutional investors.
They provide several justifications for their focus on herding at the
industry level. They first contend that the reasons that may moti
vate institutions to herd in individual stocks may also lead them

to herd at the industry level.4 Second, they cite evidence in the literature that information is not incorporated simultaneously in the
prices of all stocks in the same industry, and that investors can
therefore infer information about a given stock from other stocks
in the same industry.5 Employing the Sias measure Choi and Sias
(2009) find high levels of industry herding by institutional investors
but document only weak evidence that industries that are subjected
to high levels of herding exhibit subsequent price reversals.
This study examines whether mutual funds herd in industries
and the extent to which such herding impacts industry valuations.
Although this study shares a similar motivation to that offered by
Choi and Sias (2009) in investigating herding in industries, it
focuses on herding by mutual funds rather than institutions.6 The
focus on mutual funds is motivated by the following reasons. First,
it is well documented that mutual funds have tendencies to follow
certain behavioral patterns that might result in herding. Specifically,
previous studies show that mutual funds tend to chase certain characteristics (Falkenstein, 1996), mimic the trades of other funds with
good performance (Friend et al., 1970), trade due to reputational
concerns (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999), and trade on the same new
information (Brown et al., 2014). These types of behaviors may also
drive mutual funds to herd in industries. Second, there are data
related advantages of focusing on mutual funds rather than focusing
on all institutions. Institutional holdings data (13-F filings) are
reported at the fund family level whereas Thomson-Reuters Mutual
Fund holdings data are available at the fund level. Using the latter
we can filter out index funds and sector funds from our sample. In
addition, a fund family can be comprised of funds that trade with
the herd, against the herd, and/or independently. Mutual funds holdings database enables us to detect these differences in trading
behaviors of individual funds belonging to the same fund family.
To investigate whether mutual funds herd in industries, this
study employs both the LSV and the Sias herding measures. The
LSV measure, as applied to industries, quantifies the imbalance
between the number of buyers and sellers from a particular investor group in a specific industry during a given quarter. In contrast,
the Sias measure quantifies the degree to which members of an
investor group (mutual funds in our study) follow each other’s
industry trades in adjacent quarters. Using the LSV measure we
find that the level of industry herding by mutual funds is statistically significant for the 1980-2013 period. Using the alternative
Sias measure we find strong evidence of industry herding by
mutual funds. As an additional test we use simulations to show
that industry herding by mutual funds is significantly greater than
that is expected by chance.
We also examine whether investors’ fund flows drive industry
herding and find evidence of industry herding even after control
ling for fund flows. Our findings also indicate that the reported
industry herding is neither a manifestation of individual stock
herding nor is it driven by style investing. We report slightly higher
levels of industry herding during the internet bubble and bust
period and find weak evidence of higher sell herding after
high investor sentiment periods. We also explore the effect of
industry conditions on industry herding and find evidence that
industries with high past industry returns and high volatility levels

experience higher levels of buy herding by mutual funds in the
subsequent period.
In line with the previous studies, we also examine whether
industry herding by mutual funds affects industry returns. We find
strong positive contemporaneous relationship between industry
herding by mutual funds and industry returns. Industries that are
subjected to buy herding by mutual funds outperform industries
that are subjected to sell herding in the herding quarter(s). We find
no evidence of return reversals for these industries in the periods
following the herding, thus concluding that mutual fund herding
in industries does not drive industry values away from their
fundamentals.
Finally, we document that industry momentum, which is first
documented by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) and analyzed
extensively in the follow-up studies, is closely related to herding
of mutual funds in industries. Specifically, we provide evidence
that industry momentum profits, over the first six months of the
year after formation of winner and loser industry portfolios, are
strongly positively related to the level of herding experience by
industries during the formation period. Importantly, the industry
momentum portfolio return difference between low- and highherding industries can be completely attributed to the overperformance of winner industries that are subjected to high levels of
herding. We further show that high herding winner industries do
not experience reversals in the subsequent periods providing evidence for the notion that herding shortens the duration of the
underreaction period to good news, but does not result in the
destabilization of prices.
This paper makes contribution to two strands of literature. First,
it compliments the recent herding literature by documenting evi
dence of industry herding by mutual funds. Our results are robust
to investor fund flows, are not motivated by individual stock herd
ing and are also not driven by chance. Second, we add to the extant
literature on momentum. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) report
that past winner industries outperform past loser industries in
the subsequent six to twelve month holding period. We show that
industry momentum is related to industry herding by mutual
funds.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the data. Section 3 explains the methodology. Sections
4-6 present the empirical evidence and discuss the results. Sec
tion 7 includes our concluding remarks.

2. Data

To compute industry herding measures we merge the Thom
son-Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings database with the monthly
stock files of CRSP. The Thomson-Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings
database is merged with the CRSP Mutual Fund database using
MFLINKS database.
Our sample consists of all funds in Thomson-Reuters Mutual
Fund Holdings database excluding all international funds and
non-equity funds over the 1980-2013 period. We use ThomsonReuters classification to identify funds’ investment objectives.
Thomson-Reuters classification for investment objectives are as
follows: 1-International, 2-aggressive growth, 3-growth, 4growth-income, 5-municipal bonds, 6-bond and preferred, 7-balanced, 8-metals and 9-unclassified. To focus on actively managed
diversified equity funds we only include funds with investment
objective classification codes 2, 3 and 4 and also exclude all index
and sector funds.' We use CRSP Mutual Funds Database fund style

Table 1

Descriptive statistics of the mutual fund holdings database.
Year

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

Panel A. Number and assets of mutual funds
Number of mutual funds
Mean TNA (in million $)
Median TNA (in million $)

423
123,467
38,100

496
236,812
84,110

797
263,423
70,320

2235
538,967
99,630

2423
1,290,868
222,130

1820
1,872,231
382,285

1377
2,522,763
419,290

Panel B. Asset allocation of mutual funds
Mean ratio of CRSP stocks by value
Median ratio of CRSP stocks by value

83.507%
87.429%

83.343%
86.345%

78.997%
83.798%

78.788%
89.277%

81.673%
93.795%

81.671%
92.026%

78.966%
86.461%

In this table key statistics at five year intervals are presented for the Thomson-Reuters mutual fund holdings database. Mutual funds with investment objectives other than 2aggressive growth, 3-growth, and 4-growth-income are excluded. For each column, statistics are shown below the listed year. Panel A reports the number of funds as well as
the mean and median total net assets (in million $) of mutual funds. Panel B documents the mean and median ratios of the total value of CRSP stocks holdings to total assets of
mutual funds.

codes to identify index and sector funds. Panel A of Table 1 presents
the number of funds as well as the mean and median assets of
mutual funds over the sample period (1980-2013).
Thomson-Reuters provide mutual fund holdings and the date
for which these holdings are valid (report date, RDATE). For most
funds the holdings information is available at the end of each quarter on this database. However, for some funds there are quarters
for which this information is missing. In this paper, we include
observations with adjacent fund-stock-quarter observations.
Another complication with the Thomson-Reuters Mutual Holdings database is that there are fund holdings data for a date prior to
the end-of-quarter. We consider such reports to be as of the end of
the respective quarter following Wermers (1999). In addition, for
occasional cases where there are more than one report dates per
quarter, we only include the observations with the latest report
date. Stock information such as prices, SIC codes, cumulative factors to adjust shares outstanding and returns are obtained from
CRSP monthly stock database and matched with mutual fund database. Fund-stock observations which cannot be matched with the
CRSP are omitted.8 This does not constitute a major problem since
the stocks which are not in the CRSP database are usually very small,
and are therefore not likely to be widely held by mutual funds. Panel
B of Table 1, presents the average and median ratios of the total
value of CRSP stocks holdings to total assets of mutual funds for various years during the sample period. As can be seen from this panel,
CRSP stocks constitutes significant portion of total assets of mutual
funds. Industries are classified in this paper by using Fama and
French (1997) 49 Industry specification.9
3. Methodology

In this section we review the application of the two herding
measures that are proposed by LSV (1992) and Sias (2004) to the
industries. We also present the buy and sell conditional LSV herding measures proposed by Wermers (1999).
3.1. The LSV herding measure
One of the main objectives of this study is to examine whether
mutual funds herd in and out of industries. In this sub-section, we
apply the LSV herding measure to industries to evaluate industry
herding. We start by computing the dollar amount of quarterly
change of each mutual fund’s holdings in each industry (dolch) as
in Choi and Sias (2009).

N

dolchj,k,t = ^(pricei,t-1) (holdingsi,j,t - holdingi,j,t-1),
i=1

(1)

where N is the number of stocks held by mutual fund j over quarter
t - 1 to t and belong to industry k, holdingsi,j,t, is the number of
shares of stock i owned by mutual fund j at the end of quarter t
adjusted for stock splits, and pricei,t-1 is the per-share price of the
stock i at the end of quarter t- l.10 Because of changes in stock
prices, a mutual fund’s dollar holding in an industry might increase
or decrease even when the fund does not trade stocks in that industry. To eliminate the effect of stock price changes on the dollar
amount of change (dolch), we use the previous quarter-end prices
and the change in the number of shares to compute dollar amount
of change. We next define mutual fund k as a buyer (seller) in industry j during quarter f if dolchi,j,k > 0 (dolchi,j,k < 0). Using this definition
we then compute the ratio of number of buyers to total number of
buyers and sellers in industry k during quarter t as

where Bk,t (Sk,t) is the number of mutual funds that are buyers
(seller) in the industry k in quarter t. This ratio is referred to as
mutual fund demand. 11 Finally, the LSV herding measure, for industry k and quarter t, HMk,t, is computed as

= |pk,t-pt|-AFk,t,

(3)

where pt is the cross-sectional average of the fraction of buyers
(across all industries) in quarter t. AFk,t is an adjustment factor as
defined in LSV (1992).12
It should be noted that the LSV herding measure in Eq. (3) measures the imbalance in the number of mutual funds that are buyers
and sellers in industries without distinguishing whether the imbalance is on the buy or on the sell side. Such distinction is proposed
by Wermers (1999) who extends LSV’s measure to define buy and
sell herding measures as

3.2. The Sias herding measure
The LSV herding measure as defined in Eq. (3) detects herding
only when the number of investors (from a specific group) that
trade in the same direction exceeds what is expected during the
same time period. Sias (2004) proposes an alternative herding
measure that quantifies the degree to which investors follow
trades of other investors (in the same group) in consecutive periods. The Sias herding measure is defined as

(6)
where ρ(pk,t, pk,t-1) is the cross-sectional correlation between ratios
of buyers to all traders (mutual fund demand) in consecutive quarters, K is the number of industries, σ(pk,t) is the standard deviation
of number of buyers to all traders ratio across industries at time t,
and pk,t is computed as in Eq. (2). We will observe a positive
cross-sectional correlation (Eq. (6)) if funds follow other funds’ previous quarter trades or if they repeat their previous quarter trades.
The latter case obviously cannot be considered herding and thus its
influence should be discarded.13 For this reason, Sias (2004) segregates the cross-sectional correlation into two parts:

(7)

The first term on the right hand side of the Eq. (7) is the contribution to the cross-sectional correlation of funds following their
own trades in the previous quarter while the second term is the
contribution of funds following other funds’ trades in the previous
quarter. Dn,k,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 (0) if
fund n buys (sells) industry k in quarter t, Nk,t is the number of
mutual funds trading industry k in quarter f.
4. Evidence of industry herding by mutual funds

This section reports the empirical evidence of industry herding
by mutual funds using the previously established industry herding
measures (Eqs. (3), (4), (5) and (7)) and are estimated over the
1980-2013 period and by employing the FF 49-industry classification. We first report the statistical outcome of this investigation
and then present Monte Carlo simulation results that contrast
the distribution of the LSV and Sias herding measures as compared
to those implied by a no-herding null hypothesis. We then examine herding by funds with different investment objectives and
whether investor flows drive industry herding. We explore
whether industry herding is a manifestation of individual stock
herding and whether it is driven by style investing. We also report
industry herding by mutual funds in different time periods and
during high and low investor sentiment periods. Lastly, we investigate whether the industry conditions affect mutual fund industry
herding.

Previous studies propose several theories that explain why
institutional managers may herd at the individual stock level or
at the industry level. Institutional managers may herd if they
receive correlated signals and trade on these signals (investigative
herding; Froot et al., 1992; Hirshleifer et al., 1994), infer information from the prior trades of other managers and follow their
trades (informational cascades; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Welch,
1992), follow other managers due to reputational concerns (reputational herding; Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Zwiebel, 1995), or
follow the fads (Friedman, 1984). Furthermore, empirical evidence
presented in the literature indicates that mutual fund managers
engage in certain behavioral patterns that might result in herding.
Specifically, Brown et al. (2014) show that mutual fund managers
trade on the same new information, Friend et al. (1970) report that
mutual fund managers mimic the trades of other funds with good
performance, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) present evidence that
mutual fund managers trade due to reputational concerns, and
Falkenstein (1996) documents that mutual funds tend to chase certain characteristics. These theoretical and empirical studies indicate the possibility that the mutual funds herd in industries. We
test the following hypothesis by employing both LSV and Sias
herding measures.
Hl. Mutual funds herd in industries.14

4.3.3. LSV herding measure- the evidence
Table 2 displays the mean and median levels for the LSV herding
measure (HM) and the Wermers’ (1999) buy herding measure
(BHM) and sell herding measure (SHM). Following Wermers
(1999) the results are presented for industry-quarters traded by
at least 5, 20 and 50 mutual funds. The three respective mean values for the industry herding measure (HM) as reported in Panel A
are 1.599%, 1.557%, and 1.529%, all are significant at the 1% level.
These figures are in line with Choi and Sias’ (2009) findings for
all institutions and are slightly higher than that reported by LSV
(1992) for pension funds. Panel A also presents the corresponding
median values. All medians are also statistically significantly at the
1% level and are considerably lower than their respective means,
signifying right-skewness of this herding measure.15 Panel B presents the mean and median values for buy and sell herding for the
industry-quarters traded by at least 5, 20, and 50 mutual funds
respectively. As can be seen from this panel, the sell herding figures
are slightly greater than the buy herding figures, but not significantly
so for the industry-quarters where there are at least 50 active
mutual funds.16
The observed overall mean herding levels, though statistically
significant, are not high. As indicated by Table 2 for the case where
there are at least 50 active mutual funds on average 1.529% more
mutual funds trade industries in the same direction than what is
expected.
4.3.2. Sias herding measure - the evidence
In this sub-section we examine whether mutual funds herd in
industries using the Sias herding measure as defined in Eq. (7). This

Table 2

Evidence of herding-LSV measure.
At least 5 active mutual funds

At least 20 active mutual funds

At least 50 active mutual funds

Panel A. Herding measure
Mean
0.01599
t-Stat
(29.83)
Median
0.00827

0.01557
(30.66)
0.00820

0.01529
(31.97)
0.00827

Panel B. Buy and sell herding measures
Buy herding measure
Mean
0.01491
t-Stat
(19.51)
Median
0.00760

0.01442
(19.84)
0.00743

0.01475
(21.15)
0.00769

Sell herding measure
Mean
t-Stat
Median

0.01663
(23.45)
0.00879

0.01579
(24.04)
0.00864

0.01700
(22.62)
0.00874

This table presents mean and median values of the LSV herding measures (unconditional, buy, and sell) for industry quarters where there are at least 5,20
for each industry-quarter is defined as HMk,t, = |pk,t - pt| - AFk,t,
and 50 active mutual funds during the 1980-2013 period. The LSV herding measure,
where pk,t is the ratio of number of buyers to total number of mutual funds that are either buyers or sellers, p, is the cross-sectional average of fraction of
buyers (across K industries) in quarter t, and AFk,t is an adjustment factor that accounts for the fact that even in the case of no herding |pk,t - p,| can be
greater than zero (by chance or an odd number of traders). The buy herding measure is computed by conditioning HMk,t on (pk,t - p,) > 0, and the sell
herding measure is computed by conditioning HMk,t on (pk,t - pt) < 0. All stocks that have price information in the CRSP database are included. All sector
and index funds are excluded. Industries are classified by using Fama and French 49 Industry specification. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis.

measure is the average cross-sectional correlation of fraction of
buyers to all traders between all pairs of consecutive quarters.
However, we are primarily interested in the contribution of funds
following other mutual funds’ industry trades to this cross-sectional correlation (second term on the right hand side of Eq. (7)).
Table 3, Panel A presents the average and median values and the
corresponding Newey-West adjusted t-statistics of the cross-correlations (Newey and West, 1987). The mean values of the crosssectional correlation are 23.090%, 24.096%, and 28.935% for the
cases where there are at least 5, 20, and 50 active mutual funds,
respectively. These figures are slightly lower than what Choi and
Sias (2009) find for all institutions, but are still quite high and statistically significant at the 1% level. The median values for the
cross-sectional correlations are very close to the mean levels. Panel
B of this table reports the component of cross-sectional correlation
that arises from funds following their own industry trades (first
term in Eq. (7)), while Panel C presents the component that arises
from funds following other funds’ industry trades (second term in
Eq. (7)). As can be seen from this table the contribution of funds
following other funds constitutes a significant portion of the total
cross-sectional correlation.
We next segregate the total cross-sectional correlation and its
two components into two parts, namely the contribution of buy
herding and contribution of sell herding. The contributions of
buy and sell herding to the total cross-sectional correlation and
to its two components are computed by taking into account those
previous quarter mutual fund demand figures in excess of (for buy
herding) or less than (for sell herding) 0.5. Panels D, E, and F of
Table 3 present the contribution of buy and sell herding to the total
cross-sectional correlation, the contribution of mutual funds fol
lowing their own industry trades, and the contribution of mutual
funds following other funds’ industry trades, respectively. As for
other panels of this table, the results are reported for the indus
try-quarters where there are at least 5, 20, and 50 active mutual
funds. As can be seen from these panels the contribution of buy
and sell herding to the total cross-sectional correlation and its
two components are similar to each other. We also conduct tests
and find that contributions of buy and sell herding are not signifi
cantly different from each other.
To sum up, the results presented in this sub-section are in
support of hypothesis 1 and provide strong evidence of industry

herding by mutual funds in the Sias herding framework, that is,
mutual funds follow other mutual funds’ previous quarter industry
trades.
4.2. Simulation results vs. actual data
In this sub-section, as an additional test for the existence of
industry herding by mutual funds, we run Monte Carlo simulations
to examine whether the actual distributions of the LSV and Sias
herding measures are different from those we would observe if
no herding takes place. To generate the simulated distributions
of the two herding measures, we follow a similar procedure to that
employed by Wermers (1999). The number of mutual funds that
are buyers in industry k in quarter f is modeled as a binomial distribution, b(nk,t, pt) where nk,t is the actual total number of mutual
funds that are either buyers or sellers in industry k in quarter t
(Bk,t + Sk,t), and pt is the actual cross-sectional average of the fraction of buyers (across all industries) in quarter t. For each industry-quarter, we draw a random number between 0 and 1, round
it to 0 if the random draw is less than 1 - pt and round it to 1
otherwise. 0 indicates that fund is a seller while 1 indicates that
fund is a buyer. This step is repeated nk,t times to give a draw from
binomial distribution, b(nk,t, pt). We then repeat these steps for
each industry-quarter. Using the drawn number of buyers and sellers, we compute the simulated fraction of buyers to all traders, pk,t
for each industry-quarter and the simulated cross-sectional average of the fraction of buyers, p* (across K industries), for each quarter. We use the simulated fraction of buyers pk,t* and the simulated
cross-sectional average of fraction of buyers, pt to compute the
simulated LSV (HMsim) and the simulated Sias (ρ(pk,t, Pk,t-1*))
herding measures. We repeat this procedure to generate 1000 simulated industry-quarter observations for each actual industryquarter observation.
Panel A of Fig. 1 presents the simulated and actual distributions
of the LSV herding measure. As can be seen from this figure the
actual distribution of this measure has fatter right tail than the
simulated one, indicating that mutual funds engage in herding
behavior in industries beyond the level that is expected by random
chance. Fig. 1, Panel B shows the actual and the simulated distributions of the Sias herding measure. The actual distribution lies to the
right of the simulated distribution, which is consistent with actual

Table 3

Evidence of herding-Sias measure.

At least 20 active mutual funds

At least 50 active mutual funds

Panel A Total cross-sectional correlation
Mean
0.23090
t-Stat
(11.56)
Median
0.22751

0.24096
(13.41)
0.25352

0.28935
(17.68)
0.30076

Panel B. Contribution of mutual funds following their own industry trades
Mean
0.05907
t-Stat
(16.07)
Median
0.05437

0.05207
(18.83)
0.05021

0.04669
(17.89)
0.04645

Panel C. Contribution of mutual funds following other funds’ industry trades
Mean
0.17184
t-Stat
(8.64)
Median
0.16509

0.18889
(10.34)
0.19385

0.24267
(15.22)
0.24300

Panel D. Total cross-sectional correlation
Contribution of buy
Mean
0.11229
t-Stat
(8.30)
Median
0.11398

0.12137
(9.99)
0.12697

0.14549
(12.7)
0.15718

Contribution of sell
Mean
t-Stat
Median

0.11958
(13.14)
0.11719

0.14387
(16.69)
0.14770

Panel E. Contribution of mutual funds following their own industry trades
Contribution of buy
Mean
0.02514
t-Stat
(13.52)
Median
0.02185

0.02231
(14.38)
0.02061

0.02032
(15.42)
0.01895

Contribution of sell
Mean
t-Stat
Median

0.02975
(19.83)
0.02826

0.02637
(17.83)
0.02399

Panel F. Contribution of mutual funds following other funds’ industry trades
Contribution of buy
Mean
0.08714
t-Stat
(6.61)
Median
0.08679

0.09906
(8.29)
0.10000

0.12517
(11.22)
0.13468

Contribution of sell
Mean
t-Stat
Median

0.08983
(9.37)
0.08584

0.11750
(13.37)
0.11003

At least 5 active mutual funds

0.11861
(12.08)
0.11103

0.03392
(14.63)
0.02917

0.08469
(8.58)
0.07757

This table presents mean and median levels, and the corresponding t-Statistics based on Newey-West adjusted standard errors of the Sias herding measure for industryquarters where there are at least 5, 20 and 50 active mutual funds during the 1980-2013 period. The Sias herding measure is defined as the cross-sectional correlation
between ratios of buyers to all traders in current and previous quarter, ρ(pk,t, pk,t-1). This cross sectional correlation is segregated into two parts, cross-sectional correlation
due to funds following their own trades into the same industries and cross-sectional correlation due to funds following other funds into the same industries. Panels A, B and C
present the mean, corresponding t-statistic, and median values for total cross-sectional correlation, contribution of mutual funds following their own industry trades, and
contribution of mutual funds following other funds’ industry trades, respectively. The total cross-sectional correlation and its two parts are further segregated into two parts,
contribution of buy herding (industries mutual funds purchased in quarter t -1) and contribution of sell herding (industries mutual funds sold in quarter t - 1). Panels D, E,
and F present these results. All stocks that have price information in the CRSP database are included. All sector and index funds are excluded. Industries are classified by using
Fama and French 49 Industry specification.

cross-sectional correlations being much higher than what we may
observe by random chance alone. We employ the KolgomorovSmirnov two-sample test and find that the actual sample distributions of the LSV and Sias herding measures are statistically different from their corresponding simulated distributions at the 1%
significance level.17 These results provide evidence of mutual fund
herding in industries.

4.3. Industry herding and investment objectives
As discussed in Section 2 our sample includes mutual funds
with “aggressive-growth”, “growth” and "growth-income" investment objectives. In order to examine whether these different types
of mutual funds exhibit differences in their herding behavior, in
this sub-section we compute average herding levels separately
for these different types of funds. There is evidence of industry

herding within each of the three mutual fund investment objective
categories. For example, for industry-quarters for which there are
at least five active traders the mean LSV measures for the aggressive-growth, growth and growth-income funds are 1.044%,
1.174%, and 1.185%, respectively; all of them are statistically significant at the 1% level and these means are not significantly different
from each other.18 Funds with aggressive-growth investment objective exhibit significantly lower levels of buy herding LSV measure as
compared to the two other types of funds. Mean sell herding LSV
measure for aggressive-growth mutual funds is slightly higher than
that of growth and growth-income mutual funds. Furthermore, the
differences between mean herding levels (unconditional, buy, and
sell) using LSV measure exhibited by growth and growth-income
funds are not statistically significant. Using the Sias measure,
we report that the mean total cross sectional correlation for the

Panel A. Distributions of the Simulated and Actual LSV Herding Measure
Distribution of HMsim

Distribution of HM

Panel B. Distributions of the Actual and Simulated Sias Herding Measure
Distribution of SIASHMsim

Distribution of SiasHM

Fig. 1. Distributions of actual and simulated herding measures. The number of mutual funds that are buyers in industry If in quarter t, is modeled as a binomial distribution,

b(nk,t, pt) where nk,t
, is the actual total number of mutual funds that are either buyers or sellers in industry If in quarter t (Bk,t
, + Sk,t), and pt is the actual cross-sectional average
of fraction of buyers (across K industries) in quarter t. First, for each industry-quarter, a random number between 0 and 1 is drawn, and is rounded to 0 if the random draw is
less than 1 - pt and rounded to 1 otherwise. This step is repeated nk,t times and then for each industry-quarter. Then, using the simulated number of buyers and sellers, the
simulated fraction of buyers, pk,t, and the simulated cross-sectional average of fraction of buyers, p* (across K industries) are computed in quarter t. Finally, the simulated LSV
herding measure, HMsimk,t, is computed for each industry-quarter as HMsimk,t = |pk,t - pt - AFk,t. Actual LSV herding measure HM, as described in Table 2, is also calculated
for our sample. For each adjacent quarters, simulated Sias measure (SiasHmsim), ρ(pk,t*, pk,t-1), the cross-sectional correlation between ratios of simulated number of buyers
to all traders in current and previous quarter, is also computed. This procedure is repeated to generate 1000 simulated industry-quarter observations for each actual industryquarter observation. Actual Sias measure (SiasHM) p(pk,t, pk,t-1) as described in Table 3, is also calculated for our sample. Panel A presents the simulated and actual
distribution of the LSV herding measure (HMsimk,t, HMk,t). Panel B presents the simulated Sias herding measure (SiasHMsim), ρ(pk,t, pk,t-1*) and actual distribution of the Sias
herding measure, p(pk,t, pk,t-1).

aggressive-growth, growth and growth-income funds are 11.00%,
15.84%, and 13.57%, respectively and all three are statistically significant at the 1% level. There is no significant difference between the
herding levels according to Sias herding measure among the three
types of mutual funds.

4.4. Is industry herding driven by fund flows?

In this sub-section we examine whether the evidence of industry herding that is presented in the preceding sub-sections is driven by fund flows. Coval and Stafford (2007) show that mutual
funds buy more of the stocks that they already hold when they
experience cash inflows. Likewise, mutual funds have to sell their
holdings when they suffer excessive cash outflows. If cash inflows
and/or outflows are concentrated on funds that have similar

industry allocations, even in the absence of any herding behavior,
flows might induce funds to trade in the same direction and cause
imbalance between the proportion of number of buyers and sellers.
Similarly if these investor flows persist over several quarters
they might result in positive cross-sectional correlation between
mutual fund demands in consecutive quarters. Therefore, we need
to ensure that our reported herding behavior is not driven by fund
inflows and outflows and hence we test the following hypothesis:
H2. Mutual fund industry herding is not driven by fund flows.

To control for the effect of flows on industry herding measures,
we require a fund to change its portfolio weight in an industry in
the same direction with its trade to be classified as an active trader
for that industry-quarter.

Table 4

Herding levels after controlling for fund flows.

At least 5 active mutual funds

At least 20 active mutual funds

At least 50 active mutual funds

Panel A. LSV herding measure
Herding measure
Mean
t-Stat
Median

0.03612
(48.43)
0.02424

0.03620
(49.72)
0.02439

0.03739
(50.58)
0.02542

Buy herding measure
Mean
t-Stat
Median

0.03377
(33.8)
0.02295

0.03404
(34.59)
0.02302

0.03562
(35.69)
0.02436

0.03857
(34.75)
0.02560

0.03846
(35.77)
0.02591

0.03926
(35.89)
0.02655

0.02851
(7.84)
0.02053

0.02170
(8.4)
0.01789

0.01768
(6.96)
0.01504

Sell herding measure
Mean
t-Stat
Median
Panel B. Sias herding measure
Mean
Mutual funds following their own trades
t-Stat
Median
Mean
t-Stat
Median

Mutual funds following other funds’ trades

0.10999
(4.8)
0.13139

0.11205
(4.77)
0.13026

0.13827
(5.59)
0.13579

Mean
t-Stat
Median

Total cross-sectional correlation

0.13849
(5.60)
0.15517

0.13375
(5.52)
0.15757

0.15594
(6.01)
0.15395

This table presents the industry herding levels of mutual funds controlling for fund flows. Different from Tables 2 and 3, in this table, we require a mutual fund to change the
allocation of an industry as well as trade in the same direction to be counted as an active trader (buyer or seller). The LSV herding measures (unconditional, buy, and sell) are
as in Table 2. Panel A presents the mean and median values of these LSV herding measures for the industry-quarters where there are at least 5,20 and 50 active mutual funds
during the 1980-2013 period. Panel B presents mean and median levels, and the corresponding t-statistics based on Newey-West adjusted standard errors of the Sias herding
measure. The Sias herding measure is as defined in Table 3. All sector and index funds are excluded. Industries are classified by using Fama and French 49 Industry
specification.

Panels A and B of Table 4 present the mean and median herding
levels of the LSV and Sias measures, respectively after controlling
for fund flows. As can be seen from Panel A of this table the respective mean LSV herding measures are 3.612%, 3.620%, and 3.739%
(significant at the 1% level) for the industry-quarters where there
are at least five, twenty, and fifty active mutual funds, respectively.
The mean and median values for the buy and sell herding are also
reported in this panel. These figures are considerably higher than
those reported in Table 2. In contrast, we observe that controlling
for fund flows decreases the observed Sias measures as reported in
Panel B. The corresponding mean Sias measures are 13.849%,
13.375%, and 15.594% for the three different filters of number of
active mutual funds. However, these figures are still significant at
the 1% level. The contribution of funds following other funds continues to be a significant portion of total cross-sectional correlation. In sum, these results reveal that industry herding is not
driven by fund flows and support hypothesis 2.

4.5. Is industry herding driven by individual stock herding?
The preceding subsections provide evidence of mutual fund
herding in industries. In this subsection, we examine whether this
observed industry herding is a manifestation of individual stock
herding that is reported in the literature (e.g. Wermers, 1999;
GTW, 1995). Choi and Sias (2009) provide evidence that institutional industry herding is not a manifestation of individual stock
herding. We hypothesize that even in the presence of individual
stock herding mutual funds might herd at the industry level. We
test the following hypothesis:
H3. Mutual fund industry herding is not a manifestation of

individual stock herding.

To test this hypothesis in the LSV framework we repeat the
analysis performed in Section 4.1.1 after excluding the stock
with the highest level of herding for each industry-quarter. The

rationale for this filter is that, if we still find evidence of industry
herding even when the contribution of highest herded stock is
not taken into account then the observed industry herding cannot
be a manifestation of individual stock herding. We find that after
excluding the stock with the highest herding level in each-industry
quarter, the mean LSV herding measure is 1.0827% and statistically
significant at the 1% level for the industry-quarters where there are
at least 50 active mutual funds.
To examine the same question in the Sias framework we follow
Choi and Sias’ (2009) methodology. Choi and Sias (2009) first
define the ratio of buyers to all traders for an industry-quarter as
the weighted average of this ratio for individual stocks belonging
to the same industry where the previous quarter-end market value
is used to compute the weights. They then decompose the crosssectional correlation of the current and previous quarter weighted
ratio of number of buyers to all traders into four components: the
contribution of funds following their own stock trades, contribu
tion of funds following other funds’ individual stock trades, contri
bution of funds following themselves into other stocks in the same
industry and contribution of funds following other funds into other
stocks in the same industry. We need to focus on the fourth com
ponent of cross-sectional correlation. For our sample, the mean
values for the first, second, third, and fourth components are
4.89%, 16.69%, 5.02%, and 6.05%, respectively.19 The total cross-sectional correlation is 32.66%. All these figures are statistically significant at the 1% level. 20 These results indicate that while the
significant portion of the cross-sectional correlation arises due to
funds following other funds into the same stock, a nontrivial portion
arises due to funds following other funds into different stocks in the
same industry.

To sum, the findings in this sub-section reveal that although
individual stock herding contributes to the industry herding that
we observe, industry herding is not a manifestation of individual
stock herding supporting our hypothesis 3.
4.6. Is industry herding driven by style investing?

In this sub-section we explore the contribution of style investing to the industry herding by mutual funds. Style investing can
contribute to industry herding due to the following two main reasons. First, many industries are comprised of stocks with similar
characteristics in terms of market capitalizations (size) and bookto-market ratios (B/M).21 Funds may invest in the same industries
as a result of their other style-strategies, such as size and B/M. Second, as Choi and Sias (2009) suggest, industry related information
that managers receive might also have size-B/M components. As a
result the observed industry herding by mutual funds may be mainly
driven by mutual fund herding in different stocks with similar sizeB/M styles within the same industry.
To examine the extent to which style investing contributes to
industry herding by mutual funds we follow a similar methodology
to that of Choi and Sias (2009). We first group stocks into six styles
based on size and B/M, two size groups based on median NYSE size,
and three groups based on B/M ratios using the 30th and 70th percentile as the cut off values.22 We then segregate the contribution of
funds following other funds into other stocks in the same industry
(fourth component of total cross sectional correlation from Section 4.5) into two: (1) different stocks in the same industry and in
the same style group and (2) different stocks in the same industry
but in different style groups. We also compute the expected contribution of these two components to this fourth component of total
cross sectional correlation.23 We find that the average contributions
of components (1) and (2) are 2.67% and 3.37%, respectively, and
both are significant at the 1% level.24 The expected contributions of
(1) and (2) are 2.25% and 3.80%, respectively. The difference between
the expected and the actual values of components (1) and (2) are
0.43% and -0.43%, and these differences are not significantly different from zero. These findings suggest that industry herding is not
mainly driven by style investing.
4.7. Industry herding by mutual funds in different time periods

In this sub-section we examine industry herding by mutual
funds over different time periods. Following Choi and Sias (2009),
first, we split our sample period into two sub-periods, 19801995, and 1996-2013, to examine whether mutual fund industry
herding increased once institutional investors were required to file
their holding positions through the Electronic Data Gathering and
Retrieval (EDGAR) system after 1996. Second, we divide our sample period into three sub-periods 80s (1980-1989), 90s (19901999), and 2000s (2000-2013) to explore whether there is any

change in herding behavior by mutual funds over the three decades. Barras et al. (2010) find that US fund managers’ skill levels
exhibit signs of deterioration over the years to date. Hence we
would expect that the magnitude of industry herding grows stronger over the decades. Third, we examine industry herding over the
internet bubble and bust period (1998-2001).
Results of these analyses are reported in Table 5. Panels A and B
present the mean and the corresponding t-statistics of the LSV and
Sias herding measures, respectively for the different time periods.
The mean LSV (SIAS) measure for the post-Edgar period (19962013) is slightly higher (lower) than that for the pre-Edgar period
(1980-1995). However, consistent with the findings of Choi and
Sias (2009) we find that these differences are not significantly different from zero. We also find that the average LSV measure, which
is 1.629% during the 90s, is slightly higher than the average LSV
measures during the 80s and 2000s, but not significantly so. The
average Sias herding measure during the 80s is slightly higher than
the two other sub-periods, but again these differences are not significant at the 5% level. Therefore, the evidence reported in panels
A and B of Table 5, does not indicate that industry herding by
mutual funds increased progressively over the decades. We also
find that industry herding by mutual funds during the internet
bubble and bust period is slightly higher than that over the entire
sample period. However, the average Sias herding measures for
this period are similar to those for the entire sample period.
4.8. Investor sentiment and industry herding by mutual funds
Previous studies, (LSV, 1992; Barberis and Shleifer, 2003; and
Shleifer, 2000) suggest that individual investor sentiment might
affect institutional herding. A more recent study by Liao et al.
(2011) examines whether previous investor sentiment explains
the cross-sectional variation in individual stock herding by mutual
funds over the 2003-2007 period. They find evidence that mutual
funds engage in sell herding in stocks that have prior high sentiment. They conclude that this finding is consistent with the sentiment countering hypothesis which states that rational investors
tend to counteract the optimistic sentiment of the retail/noise
investors.
In this sub-section, we investigate whether overall market-wide
investor sentiment affects industry herding by mutual funds. We
employ Baker and Wurgler’s (2007) monthly investor sentiment
index to identify high and low investor sentiment periods.25 This
investor sentiment index is constructed based on six sentiment
proxies, namely, trading volume, the dividend premium, the
closed-end fund discount, the number and first-day returns on IPOs
and the equity share in new issues.26 As we have quarterly herding
measures we first compute quarterly averages of monthly investor
sentiment index. We next compute average quarterly investor senti
ment over the 1980-2010 period.27 We identify the quarters with
investor sentiment higher (lower) than the sample period average
as high (low) investor sentiment periods. We then compute mean
herding levels separately for the quarters following the high senti
ment and low sentiment quarters. Panel A of Table 6 presents the
LSV herding measures (unconditional, buy, and sell) after the high
and low sentiment quarters as well as the difference between them
for the industry-quarters where there are at least 5, 20, and 50 active
mutual funds. For the industry-quarters where there are at least 5
active mutual funds, average herding measure is higher after the
high investor sentiment periods than that after the low investor

Table 5

Herding levels in different time periods.

1996-2013

1980-1989

1990-1999

2000-2013

1998-2001

Panel A. LSV herding measure
Herding measure
Mean
0.01459
t-Stat
(18.14)

0.01578
(26.93)

0.01452
(13.11)

0.01629
(18.16)

0.01505
(23.54)

0.02223
(14.86)

Buy herding measure
Mean
0.01418
t-Stat
(12.44)

0.01517
(17.37)

0.01497
(9.36)

0.01451
(11.73)

0.01479
(15.18)

0.02136
(9.52)

Sell herding measure
Mean
0.01499
t-Stat
(13.21)

0.01634
(20.71)

0.01408
(9.18)

0.01790
(13.89)

0.01528
(18.20)

0.02284
(11.40)

Panel B. Sias herding measure
Total cross-sectional correlation
Mean
0.30715
t-Stat
(12.26)

0.27403
(13.16)

0.33052
(9.24)

0.27260
(12.34)

0.27339
(10.86)

0.30798
(9.56)

Mutual funds following themselves
Mean
0.05412
t-Stat
(15.17)

0.04028
(14.63)

0.05735
(10.87)

0.04603
(13.11)

0.03992
(13.79)

0.03356
(9.49)

Mutual funds following others
Mean
0.25302
t-Stat
(10.63)

0.23375
(11.06)

0.27317
(8.10)

0.22657
(9.53)

0.23347
(9.31)

0.27442
(8.28)

1980-1995

This table presents the industry herding levels of mutual funds in different time periods. LSV herding measures (unconditional, buy, and sell) are all as defined in Table 2. Sias
herding measure is as defined in Table 3. Panel A presents the herding levels according to LSV herding measure in pre-Edgar (1980-1995) and post-Edgar (1996-2013) era, in
three subperiods, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, and during internet bubble and bust period (1998-2001). Panel B presents the herding levels according to Sias herding measure for
the same time periods. Results are presented in Panel A and B are for the industry-quarters where there are at least 50 active mutual funds.

sentiment period. Furthermore, this difference is mainly due to
higher sell herding after high investor sentiment periods.28 This evidence is consistent with the findings of Liao et al. (2011) and supports the sentiment countering hypothesis. However, as we filter
the industry-quarter observations with less than 20 active traders
the difference between the average of sell herding measures after
the high and the low investor sentiment periods diminishes and it
becomes insignificant after applying 50 active traders filter. This
finding suggests that investor sentiment effect on sell herding of
mutual funds is more prominent in smaller industries. These industries are more likely to include stocks of relatively lower size for
which investor sentiment is more relevant. As these industries are
filtered out after applying higher number of active fund thresholds,
investor sentiment impact on fund herding fades out.
Panel B of Table 6 reports mean Sias herding measure (total
cross-sectional correlation and its two parts) after the high and
low sentiment quarters as well as the difference between them
for the industry-quarters where there are at least 5, 20, and 50
active mutual funds. We find no meaningful difference between
the Sias herding measures after high and low sentiment periods.
To sum up, we find some evidence that mutual funds tend to
engage in (same quarter) sell herding in industries more after opti
mistic sentiment periods, consistent with the sentiment counter
ing hypothesis.

4.9. Industry conditions and mutual fund industry herding
In this sub-section we examine whether industry conditions
affect industry herding by mutual funds. Specifically, we explore
whether previous quarter’s industry conditions such as return, vol
atility, and volume affect industry herding.
We perform similar analysis to that of a recent study by
Gavriilidis et al. (2013), which documents evidence that sector

and market conditions affect industry herding by Spanish mutual
funds. First, we examine the impact of industry returns on mutual
fund industry herding. In order to identify high-mid-low return
periods for each industry, we rank the quarterly value weighted
returns of each industry over our sample period into three groups
(high-mid-low industry returns). We compute average subsequent
quarter LSV measures separately for these high-mid-low return
groups. Panel A of Table 7 presents the mean LSV herding measures
(unconditional, buy, and sell) for the high, mid, and low industry
return groups. The last column reports the difference between
the herding measures for high and low industry return groups.
As can be seen from this panel highest (lowest) industry herding
is exhibited when the industry returns are high (low). Furthermore, the difference between herding measures in high and low
industry return groups is statistically significant at the 1% level.
The results for the buy and sell herding measures indicate that
the difference between the (unconditional) herding levels is mainly
driven by buy herding. There is no evidence that industry returns
affect subsequent quarter sell herding by mutual funds.
Second, we examine the effect of industry volatility on industry
herding using a similar analysis. We define quarterly volatility as
the standard deviation of daily (value weighted) industry returns
for each industry-quarter. In order to identify high-mid-low volatility periods for each industry, we rank the quarterly volatility of
each industry over our sample period into three groups. We again
compute average subsequent quarter LSV measures separately for
these high-mid-low volatility groups. Panel B of Table 7 presents
the results of the volatility analysis. Similar to Panel A we report
evidence that industry herding is higher after periods of high
industry volatility and this difference is mainly driven by the difference in buy herding for these high and low volatility groups. 29
Lastly, we investigate the impact of industry turnover on industry herding by mutual funds. We divide monthly volume by the
number of outstanding shares (from CRSP monthly files) to compute monthly turnover for each stock in each industry. Using the
month-end market capitalizations we compute value-weighted

Table 6

Herding Levels and Investor Sentiment.
At least 5 active mutual funds

At least 50 active mutual funds

At least 20 active mutual funds

Low

Difference

High

Low

Difference

High

Low

Difference

Panel A. LSV herding measure
Herding measure
Mean
0.01718
t-Stat
(20.94)

0.01484
(19.56)

0.00234
(2.09)

0.01626
(21.4)

0.01504
(19.94)

0.00122
(1.14)

0.01558
(22.22)

0.01519
(20.65)

0.00038
(0.38)

Buy herding measure
Mean
0.01574
t-Stat
(13.55)

0.01498
(13.43)

0.00076
(0.47)

0.01469
(13.63)

0.01516
(13.62)

-0.00047
(-0.30)

0.01529
(14.95)

0.01527
(13.97)

0.00002
(0.01)

Sell herding measure
Mean
0.01851
t-Stat
(16.00)

0.01471
(14.22)

0.00380
(2.45)

0.01768
(16.55)

0.01493
(14.56)

0.00275
(1.86)

0.01584
(16.44)

0.01512
(15.24)

0.00072
(0.52)

Panel B. SIAS herding measure
Total cross-sectional correlation
Mean
0.24798
0.21954
t-Stat
(8.32)
(7.67)

0.02844
(0.81)

0.26004
(11.11)

0.22903
(7.91)

0.03100
(0.89)

0.31199
(14.46)

0.28122
(13.47)

0.03077
(1.05)

Mutual funds following themselves
Mean
0.06379
0.05453
t-Stat
(11.63)
(11.51)

0.00926
(1.64)

0.05406
(13.31)

0.04968
(13.74)

0.00438
(1.14)

0.04943
(12.73)

0.04334
(15.31)

0.00609
(1.90)

Mutual funds following others
Mean
0.18419
t-Stat
(6.42)

0.01918
(0.56)

0.20598
(8.90)

0.17935
(5.93)

0.02662
(0.77)

0.26256
(12.82)

0.23788
(11.45)

0.02468
(0.86)

High

0.16501
(5.31)

This table presents the industry herding levels of mutual funds in high and low sentiment periods. LSV herding measures (unconditional, buy, and sell) are all as defined in
Table 2. Sias herding measure is as defined in Table 3. Baker and Wurgler’s (2007) monthly investor sentiment index is employed to identify high and low investor sentiment
quarters. We first compute quarterly averages of monthly investor sentiment index. We next compute average quarterly investor sentiment over the 1980-2010 period. We
identify the quarters with investor sentiment higher (lower) than the sample period average as high (low) investor sentiment periods. Panel A presents the subsequent
quarter herding levels according to LSV herding measure after high and low investor sentiment periods, as well as the difference between herding levels after these two
different investor sentiment periods. Panel B presents the herding levels according to Sias herding measure after high and low investor sentiment periods, as well as the
difference between herding levels after these two different investor sentiment periods. Results are reported separately for the industry-quarters where there are at least 5,20,
and 50 active mutual funds.

turnover for each industry-month. We then compute quarterly
turnover for each industry by averaging the monthly industry turnover in each quarter. After computing quarterly industry turnover
we again identify high-mid-low turnover quarters for each industry. Panel C of Table 7 presents the average LSV herding measures
for the high-mid-low industry turnover groups, as well as the difference between the average herding levels in high and low industry turnover groups. The results presented in this panel indicate
that there is no significant effect of industry turnover on industry
herding.30
We also perform similar analysis to examine the effect of industry conditions on industry herding in the Sias framework. However, we find no significant effect of industry conditions on
industry herding using Sias herding measure.31
To sum up, we find evidence that industry return and industry
volatility affect industry herding by mutual funds in the subse
quent quarter. Mutual funds tend to buy industries in herds after
high industry returns and high industry volatility periods. How
ever, industry conditions do not affect the extent to which mutual
funds’ chase previous quarter industry trades of other mutual
funds. These findings suggest that managers’ tendency to buy in
herds increases following good news in order to avoid a potential
criticism of having low ability, by claiming that they made good
investment choices similar to those made by other managers. Peri
ods of high industry volatility may indicate periods of greater flow

of information and higher information uncertainty (e.g., Ross,
1989; Zhang, 2006). Industry herding following these periods
might rise as some managers may find it more difficult to interpret
new information and instead mimic their peers in order to avoid a
possible underperformance.
5. Does mutual fund herding in industries destabilize industry
market values?

Previous empirical studies report positive contemporaneous
relationship between institutional herding and stock returns, that
is, stocks bought by herds outperform stocks sold by herds (e.g.,
Wermers, 1999; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Sias, 2004). These studies also find that stocks bought by herds continue to outperform
stocks sold by herds in the short term with no subsequent return
reversals and conclude that herding by institutions (and mutual
funds) at the stock level does not drive stock prices away from
their fundamentals. In contrast, Dasgupta et al. (201la,b) and
Gutierrez and Kelley (2008) document that persistent herding by
institutions in stocks can drive stock prices away from their
fundamentals.
There is also a theoretical paper by Dasgupta et al. (201la,b)
which suggests that reputational herding by institutions can cause
short-term return continuation and long term return reversal in
the stocks that experience high levels of herding. However, accord
ing to their model, institutional herding is driven by institutional
managers’ reputational motivations. If herding occurs as a result
of correlated signals received by institutional managers, the impact
of herding on prices can be quite different. Specifically, for the
herding at the industry level, which is the focus of this paper, if
mutual funds trade based on the new information which is yet to
disseminate across all stocks within an industry, we do not expect
a destabilizing effect of industry herding on industry values. We,
therefore, test the following hypothesis:

Table 7

Industry conditions and industry herding.

High

Mid

Low

Diff.

Panel A Industry return
Herding measure (HM)
Mean
t-Stat

0.01667
(21.19)

0.01537
(19.70)

0.01325
(14.02)

0.00342
(2.78)

Buy herding measure
Mean
t-Stat

0.01697
(14.24)

0.01673
(14.51)

0.01034
(8.34)

0.00663
(3.85)

Sell herding measure
Mean
t-Stat

0.01639
(15.84)

0.01412
(13.36)

0.01600
(11.36)

0.00038
(0.22)

Panel B. Industry volatility
Herding measure (HM)
Mean
t-Stat

0.01669
(20.17)

0.01522
(19.00)

0.01390
(16.24)

0.00279
(2.34)

Buy herding measure
Mean
t-Stat

0.01678
(13.77)

0.01618
(13.56)

0.01228
(10.31)

0.00450
(2.64)

Sell herding measure
Mean
t-Stat

0.01661
(14.80)

0.01435
(13.31)

0.01541
(12.58)

0.00120
(0.72)

Panel C. Industry turnover
Herding measure (HM)
Mean
t-Stat

0.01509
(20.74)

0.01686
(19.92)

0.01378
(14.77)

0.00131
(1.11)

Buy herding measure
Mean
t-Stat

0.01623
(14.65)

0.01453
(12.18)

0.01446
(10.79)

0.00176
(1.01)

Sell herding measure
Mean
t-Stat

0.01395
(14.82)

0.01882
(15.83)

0.01311
(10.10)

0.00084
(0.53)

This table presents the industry conditions and the industry herding levels of mutual funds in LSV framework for industry-quarters
where there are at least 50 active mutual funds. LSV herding measures (unconditional, buy, and sell) are all as defined in Table 2. Panel A
presents the herding levels according to LSV herding measures in high, mid, and low industry return periods. To identify high-mid-low
return periods for each industry we rank the quarterly value weighted returns of each industry over our sample period into three groups
(high-mid-low industry returns). First, second, and third column presents the average subsequent quarter LSV herding measures for
these high, mid, low return groups, respectively. The last column reports the average difference between the herding levels of high and
low industry return groups. Panel B presents the results of the similar analysis for high, mid, and low industry volatility periods. To
identify high-mid-low volatility periods for each industry we rank the quarterly volatility of each industry over our sample period into
three groups. Quarterly volatility is defined as the standard deviation of daily (value weighted) industry returns for each industryquarter. Panel C presents the results of the similar analysis for high, mid, and low industry turnover periods. We divide monthly volume
by the number of outstanding shares to compute monthly turnover for each stock in each industry. Using the month-end market
capitalizations we compute value-weighted turnover for each industry-month. Quarterly turnover for each industry is computed by
averaging the monthly industry turnover in each quarter.

H4. Herding at the industry level by mutual funds does not drive

industry values away from their fundamentals.

To test this hypothesis, we first rank industries according to
their previous quarter buy and sell LSV herding levels (Eqs. (4)
and (5)). We form portfolios of top five industries that experience
the highest level of buy (sell) herding. We then compute the equalweighted average of value weighted industry returns for these
portfolios in the quarters following the herding. We also form a difference portfolio which buys the top five buy and shorts the top
five sell herding industries. Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) calendar time aggregation method is used to calculate the average
returns of these three industry portfolios for overlapping observations.32 All of the above defined portfolios are rebalanced quarterly.
Table 8, Panel A, presents the monthly raw returns as well as
the CAPM, Fama-French three-factor (Fama and French, 1993),
and four-factor alphas (Carhart, 1997) for these three portfolios.
The corresponding t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The first
row of Panel A presents the contemporaneous returns and alphas

for the formation period in which top five buy and sell herding
industries are identified. The raw returns and the alphas for the
formation period are positive and statistically significant for the
difference portfolio. The mean monthly raw return as well as the
monthly CAPM, three-factor, and four-factor alphas for the difference portfolio are 1.00%, 0.96%, 0.96%, and 1.18%, respectively,
which are also economically significant. This finding is consistent
with prior studies that find a contemporaneous positive relationship between returns and herding by mutual funds and institutions. The next rows present the results for subsequent quarter
(q1). The difference portfolio continues to earn positive returns in
quarter q1 albeit not statistically significantly different from zero.
We also compute the returns in quarters q2, q3-q4, q5-q8, and
q9-q12, and find that the difference portfolio’s returns are not significantly different from zero in the subsequent periods. It can be
therefore inferred that there is no evidence of return reversals for
the industries that experience high levels of buy and sell herding.33
Panel B of Table 8 repeats the analysis in the Sias framework.
Since the Sias herding measure cannot be calculated for each
industry-quarter we compute the contributions of each industiy

to the cross-sectional correlation for each consecutive pairs of quarters. To distinguish between buy and sell herding industries we rank
these contributions separately for the industries with positive and
negative differences for both quarters, q0 and q§ (formation quarters).
To identify these industries, for each quarter, we multiply the difference between the fraction of buyers and cross-sectional average of
the fraction of buyers over the two formation quarters [(pk,t-2 - pt-2)(pk,t-1 - pt-1)]. We separately rank the industries that have
positive and negative differences for both quarters, q0 and q0. The
industries with the top five highest contributions among the ones
with positive (negative) differences for both quarters are identified
as top five buy (sell) herding industries. The first two rows of Panel
B present the average raw returns as well as CAPM, three-factor,
and four-factor alphas during the formation quarters. As in Panel A,
the difference portfolio has positive and statistically significant raw
and abnormal returns in the formation quarters. Raw returns for
the difference portfolio are 0.89% and 0.75% for quarters q0 and q0,
respectively, and the various monthly alphas for these formation
quarters range between 0.67% and 0.96%. Panel B also presents the
results for the subsequent quarter (q1). In quarter q1 the difference
portfolio’s raw and abnormal returns are positive, but not significantly different from zero. The difference portfolio continues to earn
returns that are not significantly different from zero in periods q2, q3q4, q5-q8, and q9-q12, indicating no evidence of return reversal.34
The findings in Table 8 point to a positive contemporaneous
relationship between industry herding and industry returns. There
is no evidence of return reversals in industries that experience high
levels of buy and sell herding. Therefore, the hypothesis that herd
ing does not drive industry values away from fundamentals
(hypothesis 4) cannot be rejected.
6. Does mutual fund herding in industries contribute to
industry momentum?

Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) show that industries that performed well (poorly) over the previous six-months continue to
perform well (poorly) over the subsequent six to twelve month
period. One of the potential explanations they offer for this phenomenon is that information may not diffuse simultaneously into
the stock prices within the same industry. Information is likely to
be first incorporated into the prices of larger firms and then into
the prices of other firms. They argue that this lead and lag effect
within the leaders and other firms in industries can cause the
observed momentum effect in industry returns. This lead and lag
effect within industries can also result in industry herding. We
argue that industry herding and industry momentum can be
related and therefore we test the following hypothesis.
H5. Industry momentum is related to mutual fund herding at the

Mutual fund herding and industry returns.

Table 8

industry level.

Although there is no empirical evidence in the literature about
the relationship between momentum and herding at the industry
level, Nofsinger and Sias (1999) document that momentum is
related to institutional herding at the individual stock level. More
specifically, they find that winners (losers) that experience largest
subsequent institutional ownership increase (decrease) exhibit the
strongest momentum. In this section, we explore the relationship
between momentum and herding at the industry level by employ
ing a similar methodology.
We first examine whether there is any evidence of industry
momentum when industries are classified according to Fama and
French 49 industry classification. We then investigate whether
holding period returns of winner and loser industries differ based

Table 9

Industry herding and industry momentum-(6 month formation/6 month holding).

Panel A Raw returns (in percent)
Past loser industries

Past winner industries
Winners-losers

Panel B. CAPM alphas (in percent)
Past loser industries

Past winner industries
Winners-losers

Industry momentum

High herding

Intermediate herding

Low herding

High-low

0.91***
(3.28)
1.23***
(4.97)
0.32*
(1.77)

0.89***
(3.13)
1.38***
(5.26)
0.49**
(2.25)

0.90***
(3.16)
1.29***
(5.07)
0.39**
(2.01)

0.95***
(3.17)
1.03***
(3.96)
0.08
(0.37)

-0.06
(-0.37)
0.35***
(2.67)
0.41**
(1.97)

-0.15
(-1.23)
0.23**
(2.15)
0.39**
(2.15)

-0.15
(-1.00)
0.39***
(2.71)
0.54**
(2.48)

-0.17
(-1.26)
0.28**
(2.43)
0.46**
(2.34)

-0.14
(-0.86)
0.03
(0.23)
0.17
(0.76)

-0.02
(-0.12)
0.36***
(2.69)
0.38*
(1.80)

-0.30**
(-1.99)
0.25*
(1.83)
0.55**
(2.50)

-0.30**
(-2.21)
0.20*
(1.75)
0.50**
(2.53)

-0.36**
(-2.46)
-0.03
(-0.22)
0.34
(1.54)

0.06
(0.40)
0.28**
(2.10)
0.22
(1.05)

0.5108
0.5091
-0.0017
(-0.46)

0.5274
0.5039
-0.0235***
(-4.46)

-0.0203
0.0180
0.0382***
(5.57)

Panel C. Three-factor alphas (in percent)
Past loser industries
-0.32***
(-2.70)
Past winner industries
0.14
(135)
Winners-losers
0.46**
(2.54)

Panel D. The ratio of number of buyers to total number of buyers and sellers
Past loser industries
0.5151
0.5072
Past winner industries
0.5116
0.5219
Winners-losers
-0.0035
0.0147***
(3.22)
(-1.19)

Industries are ranked into quartiles according to their previous six month (formation period) cumulative value weighted returns. The top twelve performing industries are
defined as winners and the bottom twelve performing industries as losers. Equal weighted portfolios of these winner and loser value weighted industries are then
constructed. These winner and loser portfolios are held for 6 months (m1 to m6, holding period) and they are rebalanced quarterly. A portfolio that takes long position in the
winner industries and short position the loser industries is also constructed. Average monthly returns for the winner, loser and winner minus loser industry portfolios over
the next 6 months are computed. We use the Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) calendar time aggregation method to calculate average returns of industry portfolios for
overlapping observations. First column of Panel A reports these average returns over the 1980-2013 period for the winner, loser and winner minus loser industry portfolios.
Industries in the winner and loser portfolios are next grouped into tertiles based on the two formation quarters’ mutual fund demand (pk,t, Eq. (2)) which is the ratio of
number of buyers to total number buyers and sellers in industry k during quarter t. The top (bottom) four industries with highest (lowest) pk,t ratio among the winners (losers)
are labeled as high herding industries and the bottom (top) four industries with lowest (highest) pk,t ratio among the winners (losers) are labeled as low herding industries.
Four industries that constitute the middle fertile based on the pk,t ratio are labeled as intermediate herding industries. Winner, loser and winner minus loser portfolios
average return are computed separately for these three sub-categories: high herding, intermediate herding, and low herding. The difference between the high herding and
low herding industries are also presented. The second to fifth columns of Panel A report the average raw returns for these portfolios. Panel B and Panel C report the CAPM and
Fama-French three-factor alphas, respectively for these portfolios of industries. Panel D presents the pk,t ratio and difference between the pk,t ratio for the winner and loser
industries. The corresponding t-statistics are presented in parenthesis. Industries are classified by using Fama and French 49 Industry specification. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

on the level of mutual fund demand (Eq. (2)) that they experience
during the formation period.35
We start by ranking industries into quartiles according to their
previous six month (formation period; m_5 to m0, where m0 is the
last month of the formation period) cumulative value weighted
returns.36 The top twelve performing industries are defined as winners and the bottom twelve performing industries as losers. We then
construct equal weighted portfolios of these winner and loser value
weighted industries. These winner and loser portfolios are held for
the next six months (holding period, m1 to m6) and they are rebalanced quarterly. We also construct a portfolio that takes long position in the winner industries and short position in the loser
industries. We compute average monthly returns for the winner,
loser and winner minus loser industry portfolios over the next six
months. As in Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), average monthly
returns of each industry are value weighted, but the winner and

loser industry portfolios are equal weighted. We employ Jegadeesh
and Titman’s (1993) calendar time aggregation method to calculate
average returns of industry portfolios for overlapping observations.
First column of Panel A of Table 9 reports these average returns of
the winner, loser, and winner minus loser industry portfolios over
the 1980-2013 period. The winner minus loser portfolio earns a
monthly average return of 0.32% and it is statistically significant at
the 10% level. We also compute CAPM and three-factor alphas of
these three portfolios and present the results in the first columns
of Panels B and C, respectively. The CAPM and the three factor alpha
of the winner minus loser (momentum) portfolio is 0.39% and 0.46%,
respectively and both are statistically significant at the 5% level.
We next group winner and loser industries into tertiles based
on their mutual fund demand (pk,t, Eq. (2)), the ratio of the number
of buyers to total number of buyers and sellers in industry k during
quarter f, during the two quarters of the formation period. The top
(bottom) four industries with highest (lowest) mutual fund
demand among the winners (losers) are labeled as high herding
industries and the bottom (top) four industries with lowest (highest) mutual fund demand among the winners (losers) are labeled
as low herding industries. The four industries that constitute the
middle tertile based on the mutual fund demand are labeled as
intermediate herding industries. We repeat the above analyses
for the winner, loser and winner minus loser portfolios separately

for these three sub-categories: high herding, intermediate herding,
and low herding. We also compute the difference between the high
herding and low herding industries.38
The second to fourth columns of Panel A of Table 9 report the
average raw returns of the loser, winner, and winner minus loser
portfolios separately for the three herding groups: high herding,
intermediate herding, and low herding industries. The last column
reports the difference between high and low herding groups for
these portfolios. In Panels B and C, we report the CAPM and three
factor alphas, respectively for these portfolios. As can be seen from
the three panels of Table 9, for the high and intermediate herding
industries winner minus loser portfolios earn positive and statistically significant average raw returns, CAPM alphas, and three-factor alphas. However, for the low herding industries there is no
evidence of industry momentum - the average raw return, CAPM
and three-factor alphas for this winner minus loser portfolio of
low herding industries are not significantly different from zero.
The difference between the average momentum returns of high
herding and low herding industries is 0.41% and statistically significant at the 5% level, and this difference is marginally significant
after adjusting for market risk.39 This difference between momentum returns is mainly driven by the difference between the returns
of winner industries. The difference between average returns of high
herding and low herding winner portfolios is 0.35% and statistically
significant at the 1% level. In contrast, there is no significant difference between the returns of high herding and low herding loser
industries. This indicates that winner industries with low mutual
fund demand (low herding) during the formation period do not continue to earn superior returns in the subsequent six months. In contrast, winner industries that experience high mutual fund demand
(high herding) during the last quarter of the formation period continue to earn abnormal returns in the following six month period.
These results are in support of hypothesis 5.40
We also explore the mutual fund demand in the subsequent
quarter (first quarter of the holding period) for the winner and
loser industries. These results are reported in Panel D of Table 9.
We find no significant difference between the subsequent mutual
fund demand for winner and loser industries as can be seen in
the first column of Panel D. However, mutual fund demand for
winner industries in the first quarter of the holding period is significantly higher (lower) than that for loser industries with high (low)
herding. This finding suggests that winner industries that experience high (low) demand in the formation period continue to experience higher (lower) demand than loser industries do in the first
quarter of the holding period, consistent with the evidence of
industry herding reported in Section 4.1.2.
To sum up, in this section we provide evidence that industry
momentum in the first six months of the year after the formation
period is mainly observed in industries that experience high herd
ing (high mutual fund demand) during the formation period. There
is no evidence of momentum in industries that experience low
herding during the formation period. This difference between the
momentum returns of high and low herding industries is primarily

driven by the difference between the subsequent returns of winner
industries.
7. Conclusion

Using the LSV (1992) and the Sias (2004) herding measures this
study documents that mutual funds engage in industry herding.
Monte Carlo simulations provide strong evidence that observed
levels of industry herding are significantly higher than what could
be expected by chance. We further document that industry herding
by mutual funds is not driven by fund flows or style investing and
is not a manifestation of individual stock herding.
This study also comments on the relationship between mutual
fund herding and the returns on the herded industries. We docu
ment that industries that are bought by herding mutual funds out
perform industries that are sold by herding mutual funds in the
quarter in which herding takes place. We find no evidence of
return reversals for these industries, indicating that mutual fund
herding has no destabilizing effect on industry values. Finally, this
paper makes a contribution to the vast momentum literature by
showing that industry momentum in winner industries depends
on the extent that mutual funds herd away or to these winner
industries during the formation period.
The findings of this study also have important implications for
both individual investors and institutional investors especially for
the ones who implement industry strategies. These investors
may benefit from incorporating the information that mutual funds
herd in industries and that certain conditions are associated with
such herding behavior into their industry strategies. The evidence
provided in this paper is also important for the mutual fund inves
tors as it suggests that actively managed mutual funds follow the
crowd when they trade industries. This information would be valu
able to fund investors especially if herding in industries affects
fund performance and the tendency of funds to engage in such
behavior is predictable.
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